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Abstract We examine the role of defaults in high-frequency, small-scale choices using
unique data on over 13 million NYC taxi rides. We exploit a shift in the set of default tip
suggestions presented to customers prior to payment, as the base fare changes from below
$15 to above $15. Using a regression discontinuity design, we show that default suggestions
have a large impact on tip amounts. These results are supported by a secondary analysis
that uses the quasi-random assignment of customers to different cars to examine default
effects on all fares above $15. Finally, we highlight a potential cost of setting defaults too
high, as a higher proportion of customers opt to leave no credit card tip when presented with
the higher suggested amounts.
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21 Introduction
The large effects of default options on consumer choices have been documented in various
high-stakes, but low-frequency contexts, ranging from organ donation to 401(k) contribu-
tions. Because defaults preserve freedom of choice, but nonetheless appear to strongly influ-
ence behavior, they have been of great interest to both policy makers and academics (Nudge,
Thaler & Sunstein 2008). In contrast to the extant literature, we study the effects of de-
faults on a frequently encountered consumer choice: the decision of how much to tip a service
provider.1 By studying tipping, we demonstrate the ability of defaults to nudge behavior
in a decision problem which agents have arguably encountered enough times to learn their
optimal responses. In doing so, we also extend the literature by documenting a case in which
default effects were exploited by a for-profit industry.
Our study introduces a unique data set that contains fare information for 170 million
NYC taxi rides over the calendar year of 2009. Among these rides, we have tip information
for the 38 million credit card transactions, from which we use a sample of 13 million rides
to study tipping.2 At the end of each ride, customers who used credit cards were presented
with a screen that provided them with the option to either type in a desired tip amount or
to press one of three buttons with default tip suggestions. During the period of study, one
of the credit card machine companies offered different tip suggestions depending on whether
the fare was above or below $15.3 For rides under $15, tip suggestions were $2, $3, and
$4, while rides above $15 were presented with 20%, 25%, and 30% tip suggestions. At the
discontinuity, this shift represents an increase in the suggestion categories (low, medium,
and high) of approximately $1, $0.75, and $0.50 for rides without tolls, taxes, or surcharges.
Importantly, the shift in suggestions did not change the choice set; customers were still free
1Though difficult to precisely measure, Azar (2011) estimates total annual tipping in the US food industry
alone at $46 billion, or approximately 0.3% of annual GDP.
2Our sample of study consists of the entire universe of credit card transactions during a period of time
in which there were no tolls, taxes, or surcharges.
3More precisely, the threshold is determined by the “base amount”(the sum of the fare, taxes, tolls, and
surcharges); however, in the sample we focus on, the base amount is equivalent to the fare.
3to key in any tip amount. Under the assumption that all ride characteristics that affect
tips vary smoothly with the base amount, the difference at the discontinuity can be used to
identify the causal effect of this particular increase in default suggestions on tipping. We
find that this local treatment effect is an increase in tip amounts of approximately $0.27 -
$0.30, greater than a 10% increase in the average tip at that margin.
Part of the observed default effect at the discontinuity may be attributed to the difficulty
of converting between dollars and percentages (Kahneman 2011).4 To address this concern
and to examine the role of default suggestions across a larger range of fares, we present
a second econometric strategy. We use the quasi-random assignment of passengers to taxi
cabs at LaGuardia airport to compare across credit card machine companies. For rides
above $15, both companies provided percentage defaults; however, one company provided
15%, 20%, and 25% percent, while the other provided defaults of 20%, 25%, and 30%
percent. The distribution of tips clearly reflects this shift, and again, we find that higher
defaults are associated with higher average tip amounts, controlling for time-invariant driver
characteristics.
Having demonstrated the benefits of higher default suggestions on the intensive margin
of tipping, we next highlight a potential cost of setting defaults too high. First, in both the
regression discontinuity design and the comparison across vendors, we find that the higher
default suggestions reduce the probability of leaving a tip that corresponds to one of the
tip suggestions (24 and 7.8 percentage point reductions respectively).5 More striking is the
result that rides with the higher tip suggestions are almost twice as likely to receive a zero-
valued tip as their competitors (a 2.8 percentage point increase). Such customers may have
4On its own, the difficulty of comparing across the measurements does not imply that we should find
higher tip amounts for the percentage suggestions. One potential explanation of this pattern would rely
on this computational difficulty interacting with a particular type of self-deception. If customers adhere to
tip percentage norms, then dollar suggestions could result in less generous tips by lowering the cost of self-
deception. For example, consider a customer that has a fare of $13 and adheres to a 25% tipping norm (i.e.
a tip of $3.25). This customer may be able to convince herself that she is adhering to the norm by selecting
the $3 option (rounding in the direction of her self-interest), whereas she could not ignore her deviation from
the norm if explicitly presented with the 25% option.
5However, we also find that the average manually entered tip amount increases. Thus, it’s not clear that
those induced to leave a manual tip are leaving lower tips than they would with the lower suggestions.
4been penalizing drivers for using tip defaults that are perceived as unfairly high.
Finally, we investigate heterogeneity and shed some light on potential mechanisms. Sev-
eral factors may explain our observed default effects. Customers may be rationally inatten-
tive, failing to compute their preferred tip due to the opportunity cost of time and/or the
cognitive costs associated with that computation. Moreover, customers that are unfamiliar
with the tipping norm may interpret the defaults as the socially endorsed norm. Both unin-
formed and informed customers may experience disutility from deviating from these options.
To investigate these mechanisms, we exploit the geocoding of our data to merge the pick-up
and drop-off location census tracts to the American Community Survey. Ultimately, the data
do not provide strong support for one mechanism over the other. Indeed, several attempts at
splitting the sample suggest a striking robustness and constancy of the effect across different
possible types of customers.
We build upon the broad literature on defaults. Default effects have been demonstrated
across a wide variety of consumer choices. Most notably, Madrian and Shea (2001) and Choi
et al. (2004) found large effects in retirement savings contributions, with Madrian and Shea
(2001) finding a 50% increase in enrollment from switching from an opt-in to automatic
enrollment default.6 In a similarly sparsely encountered consumer choice, Goldstein and
Johnson (2003) and Abadie and Gay (2006) used cross-country analyses to suggest that
presumed consent policies induce higher organ donation rates than opt-in policies. Johnson et
al. (1993) studied a somewhat more frequently encountered type of decision problem, namely
(car) insurance plan choice.7 Downs et al (2009) found that a convenience manipulation
that approximates a default influenced food purchase decisions.8 Our paper contributes
by showing that default effects can persist in a similarly habitually encountered consumer
6Similarly, Cronqvist and Thaler (2004) found evidence of large default effects in their study of the
Swedish social security privatization.
7Furthermore, Johnson et al (2002) studied default effects in the decision to accept email marketing.
8In their experiment, fast-food restaurant patrons were provided with a free meal upon completion of a
survey. Participants were provided with a survey binder followed by a one-page menu featuring either five
low-calorie, five high-calorie, or a mix of sandwiches – other options were provided in a pamphlet at the back
of the binder. Relative to the mixed-calorie condition, subjects in the low-calorie treatment were 47% more
likely to choose a low-calorie sandwich.
5choice, using a much larger naturalistic field data set. We also add to the literature by
tracing out the response to higher defaults, including its limitations. Beshears et al (2010)
similarly study the limits to setting high defaults. They provide a case study of a firm that
set the default contribution rate at 12%, a rate much higher than previously studied defaults
in this area (2% - 6%) and one that the authors note was sub-optimal for all employees in
the sample. They find that roughly 25% of employees remain at this default rate after 12
months of tenure, in comparison to the 60% adherence rate seen at firms in previous studies.
In our study, we find that a substantial proportion are induced to opt out of the default when
presented with the higher suggestions. We still find a higher average contribution despite
this result; however, our analysis also highlights the emergence of a cost (zero-valued tips)
that suggests a potential reduction in tips if defaults are set sufficiently high.9
Our paper also relates to an emerging literature on active choice; a form of design in
which no default option is provided, and instead, consumers are forced to explicitly choose
an option. Carroll et al (2009) studied the effects of switching from an opt-in regime to
active choice in 401(k) plan enrollment, finding a 28% increase in enrollment under active
choice relative to opt-in. The language used in the active choice condition was careful to
not favor one choice over the other (I want to enroll vs. I don’t want to enroll). In contrast,
Keller et al (2011) ran a set of small experiments that tested the relative effectiveness of
opt-in, active choice, and enhanced active choice (using language that favored one option).
Our setting is similar to enhanced active choice, as all customers were still required to make
an active choice – a tip amount had to be selected to complete payment. However, as in the
enhanced active choice studies, certain options were favored, in our case by convenience and
by the potentially implied endorsement of being set apart. Our analysis uniquely combines
clean identification of the effect of enhanced active choice with the naturalism of field data.
9This cost of setting defaults too high also relates to the results of a charitable giving field experiment
by Karlan, List, and Shafir (2011). In their experiment, matching grants were framed as either $1 for every
$1/$3 or $25 for every $25/$75. They found that using higher example amounts resulted in fewer and smaller
donations. While this particular effect is open to a number of possible interpretations, it is consistent with a
potential backfiring of setting implied appeals too high (even when those appeals are just example amounts
that are not convenience advantaged).
6The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background on taxis and tipping
and describes the data used. Section 3 presents our regression discontinuity results and
robustness tests. Section 4 presents an analysis that compares across credit card machine
companies. Section 5 presents results on the cost of setting defaults too high. Section 6
explores heterogeneity and mechanisms. Section 7 concludes.
2 Institutional Context and Data
The data for our study was provided by the Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) of
New York City. In May 2004, the TLC mandated that all taxi cabs be outfitted with a
set of technological improvements, including the electronic collection and transmission of
trip data and the introduction of equipment to accept credit cards.10 These technological
improvements also marked the introduction of a system that measured and saved the GPS
coordinates of all pick-up and drop-off locations. Though mandated in 2004, the entire taxi
fleet was not outfitted with the equipment until 2008.11 Our data spans the entirety of 2009,
covering all rides by licensed Yellow Cab drivers in NYC. Before describing the data, we first
present the details on the institutional context.
2.1 Institutional Context
During the period of study, three companies were contracted to provide taxi cabs with credit
card machines. The largest two, which we denote as “Vendor” and “Competitor”, account
for 49% and 45% of observations in the raw data respectively. Each taxi cab was equipped
with its own Passenger Information Monitor (PIM) which would display advertisements
and other viewing material during the ride. At the end of the ride, the PIM displayed a
payment screen. Figure 1 provides an example of a payment screen that would be presented
10Source: http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/industry/taxicab serv enh.shtml.
11Source: “Despite some grumbling, however, the TLC is moving to install the devices in all cars by
August 31.” http://www.nysun.com/business/hot-tip-for-cabbies-credit-cards-boost-tips/72783/.
7to customers.
Figure 1: Example of a Passenger Information Monitor (PIM) payment screens by the
Vendor (Top) and the Competitor (Bottom)
Notes: The top and bottom rows of screens correspond to Vendor and Competitor, respectively. The sequence of payment
screens follows from left to right. The authors took these screen-shots from taxi cabs in October 2012. During the period
pictured, both the Vendor and Competitor only provide 20%/25%/30% default tips, and both compute these tips on only the
fare. In contrast, during the period of our study (2009), the Vendor offered defaults of $2/$3/$4 for amounts less than $15
and defaults of 20%/25%/30% (computed on the fare) for fares greater than $15, while the Competitor offered defaults of
15%/20%/25% (computed on the sum of fare, tax, surcharge, and tolls) for all fares.
Customers were presented with the base amount and had the option of keying in their own
tip amount or using one of the suggested tip buttons. Each vendor was allowed discretion
over how this page was displayed, and the two companies elected to offer different default
buttons during the period we study.
There were two key ways in which the Vendor and Competitor differed with respect to
tip suggestions. The Competitor offered three suggestions on all base amounts: 15%, 20%,
or 25%. In contrast, the Vendor provided one set of suggestions ($2, $3, or $4) for all base
amounts lower than $15, and another set of suggestions (20%, 25%, or 30%) for all base
amounts above $15. The second difference is how the percentages were calculated. Though
the Vendor used the base amount (i.e. the fare, toll, MTA tax, and surcharge) to determine
8which set of suggestions to provide, the percentage tips were calculated on only the fare.
The Competitor instead calculated percentages on the entire base amount. Thus, if the
ride consisted of a $10 fare and a $10 toll, a customer that pushed the 20% button with
the Vendor equipped cab would be paying $2 in tip, whereas a customer in a Competitor
equipped cab would be paying $4. These differences are summarized in Figure 2. A third
difference that currently exists, but may not have during the study period, is that the Vendor
also displays corresponding dollar amounts with the percentage tips, while the Competitor
does not display these conversions.
Figure 2: Tip Default Suggestions by Vendor and Competitor
Taxi meters determined the fare through a combination of time and distance measures.
The standard city rate (Rate Code 1) charged customers $2.50 upon entry, and $0.40 for
each additional unit.12 One unit is defined as either (1) a 60 second interval in which the
car is idle or driving less than 6 miles per hour or (2) 0.20 miles when the car is driving 6
12Other Rate Codes include:
• Rate Code 2 - Rides to and from JFK - Charged a flat rate of $45.
• Rate Code 3 - Rides to and from Newark Airport - Charged the standard rate in addition to a $15
surcharge.
• Rate Code 4 - Rides to Nassau or Westchester county - Charged the standard city rate while in city
limits, and double the standard rate while in Nassau or Westchester county.
• Rate Code 5 - Rides outside NYC, excluding Nassau, Westchester, or Newark Airport - Charged flat
rate (determined through negotiation between rider and driver).
Source: http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/passenger/taxicab rate.shtml.
9miles per hour or faster. Fractional amounts are rounded up to the next unit. Riders were
also subject to different sets of surcharges depending on the period of the year or the period
of the day. We define six pricing regimes accordingly. The first three pricing regimes cover
the period of January 1, 2009 to October 31, 2009. Pricing regime one spans 6am to 4pm
on Monday - Friday and 6am to 8pm on Saturday and Sunday. Customers were not subject
to any surcharges during this first pricing regime. The second regime covers 4pm to 8pm
on Monday through Friday. During these peak weekday hours, customers were subject to a
surcharge of $1.00. The third regime covers 8pm to 6am on all days, during which customers
were subject to a $0.50 nighttime surcharge. Regimes 4 to 6 cover the period of November
1, 2009 to December 31, 2009. These last three regimes are similar to 1-3, except that riders
were additionally subject to a $0.50 MTA tax. To maintain comparability on either side of
the Vendor default discontinuity, we limit our primary analysis to pricing regime one, which
corresponds to a plurality among these regimes (> 34% of rides). We further restricted this
sample to rides that did not pass through tolls. During this regime, the largest base amount
to the left of the $15 discontinuity was $14.90, and the largest base amount to the right of
the discontinuity was $15.30.
2.2 Data Description
Our preliminary data set included 170,896,479 observations. Though the TLC has its own
private routine for removing electronic glitches, the provided data set still contained a number
of possible electronic errors, including zero-valued distances/durations and surcharges that
did not correspond to the appropriate schedule. We took a number of steps to clean the
data, which we outline in greater detail in Appendix A. Our largest sample reductions were
the removal of Cash payments (approximately three-quarters of the sample), and limiting
the sample to the pricing regime under which there were no taxes or surcharges. Our final
dataset consists of 13,820,735 rides. For the majority of our estimates, we limit our sample
to rides complete on cars equipped by the Vendor (7.26 million) and to fares between $5 and
10
$25 (6.24 million observations).
The variables provided in the data are as follows: anonymized driver identifier, car iden-
tifier, credit card machine company, payment type, ride duration, ride distance, number of
passengers, fare, surcharge, MTA tax, toll amount, and pick-up and drop-off latitude, lon-
gitude, and time. Because we do not have an indicator for whether the customer physically
selected one of the default suggestion buttons, we needed to create this key variable. To do
so, we make the assumption that all tip amounts that correspond to one of the relevant tip
suggestions (e.g. $2/$3/$4 for “Vendor” if the base amount is less than $15) were selected
from one of these buttons. We thus make the assumption that customers recognize this
congruence and save the time of keying in this amount by pressing a single button.
For the purpose of computing heterogeneous treatment effects, we use data from the
American Community Survey’s 5 year estimates (2005 - 2009). This dataset provides census
tract level summary statistics. We match these statistics to each pickup and drop-off location.
To do so, we first assign each GPS coordinate to a census tract using a point-in-polygon
operation in PostgreSQL (PostGIS). We then merge each pickup location and each drop-off
location with the ACS census tract variables. We focus on one variable in particular: median
household income.13
To better understand the data, we provide a few descriptive tables and figures. Figure 3
plots the geospatial distribution of fares and tip percentages, splitting the pick-up location
census tracts into five quantiles and shading accordingly. Table 1 cross tabulates the pick-up
and drop-off boroughs of all trips in our final sample. More than 90% of rides both start
and end in Manhattan. Table 2 provides a table of summary statistics by ride. The average
fare is $9.75 and the average tip percentage is 18.13%.
13Unfortunately, many taxi transactions happen in non-residential or tourist areas of the city, such as
Midtown or Wall Street. For those census tracts, the median income is unlikely to be a good proxy for
customer income.
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Notes: Fare and Tip Percentage, by census tract of Pick-Up Location. Graphs on the left display all of NYC. Graphs on the
right display Manhattan. Sample limited to Vendor-equipped cab rides during the first price regime: January 1, 2009 - October
31, 2009. 6am - 4pm on Monday - Friday and 6am - 8pm on Saturday and Sunday.
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Table 1: Cross-Tabulation of Pick-up and Drop-off NY Borough
Brooklyn Manhattan Queens Staten Island The Bronx Non-NYC/Missing Total
Brooklyn 54,927 131,159 14,496 76 220 246 201,124
Manhattan 183,845 12,793,937 188,085 170 26,055 9,976 13,202,068
Queens 58,108 170,306 139,928 88 1,226 3,472 373,128
Staten Island 70 131 25 828 2 69 1,125
The Bronx 51 2,977 397 2 8,087 173 11,687
Non-NYC/Missing 401 6,440 568 77 160 23,957 31,603
Total 297,402 13,104,950 343,499 1,241 35,750 37,893 13,820,735
Notes: Sample limited to cab rides during the first price regime: January 1, 2009 - October 31, 2009. 6am - 4pm on Monday -
Friday and 6am - 8pm on Saturday and Sunday.
Table 2: Summary Statistics by Ride
Competitor Vendor Total
Fare 9.690 9.813 9.755
(5.480) (5.669) (5.580)
Tip Amount 1.694 1.920 1.813
(1.253) (1.431) (1.354)
Tip as Percentage of Fare 18.27 21.46 19.95
(9.254) (16.59) (13.72)
Tip Corresponds to a Default Tip Option 0.556 0.495 0.524
(0.497) (0.500) (0.499)
Ride Duration (Minutes; Dropoff Time - Pickup Time) 12.67 12.85 12.77
(8.136) (7.931) (8.029)
Ride Distance (Miles) 2.531 2.596 2.565
(2.310) (2.401) (2.359)
Zero Tip 0.0196 0.0289 0.0245
(0.139) (0.167) (0.155)
High Choice [Pr(Select ’High’ Default Tip | Selected a Default Option)] 0.129 0.0371 0.0832
(0.335) (0.189) (0.276)
Med Choice [Pr(Select ’Med’ Default Tip | Selected a Default Option)] 0.419 0.184 0.302
(0.493) (0.388) (0.459)
Low Choice [Pr(Select ’Low’ Default Tip | Selected a Default Option)] 0.452 0.778 0.615
(0.498) (0.415) (0.487)
Observations 6,542,783 7,277,952 13,820,735
Notes: High Choice (Vendor: $4 or 30%, Competitor: 25%), Medium Choice (V: $3 or 25%, C: 20%), Low Choice (V: $2 or
20%, C: 15%) estimates are conditional on using a default tip option. Sample limited to cab rides during the first price regime:




We start by presenting visual evidence of the discontinuity. We limit the forcing variable
(fare) to be between $5 and $25 and calculate the mean tip percentage within each of the
discrete fare amounts ($0.40 increments). On each side of the discontinuity, we scatter plot
these estimates and perform a lowess smoother separately on either side of the discontinuity.
Figure 4 displays this plot for tip percentages on Vendor equipped cabs during pricing regime
one, clearly demonstrating a jump at $15. As a first test of the validity of the RDD, Figure
5 demonstrates that the density of the forcing variable is smooth.















5 10 15 20 25
fare
 Fare < $15  Fare >= $15
Mean
Notes: Sample limited to Vendor-equipped cab rides during the first price regime: January 1, 2009 - October 31, 2009. 6am -
4pm on Monday - Friday and 6am - 8pm on Saturday and Sunday.
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Notes:Sample limited to Vendor-equipped cab rides during the first price regime: January 1, 2009 - October 31, 2009. 6am -
4pm on Monday - Friday and 6am - 8pm on Saturday and Sunday.
3.2 Regression
To supplement the visual evidence, we estimate a regression discontinuity model for the case
of a forcing variable with discrete support. To the extent that the tip paid is smoothly
related to the fare, observations at either side of the cutoff can be used to identify the causal
effect of a change in the suggested amount. Following Lee and Card (2008), we estimate
equation (1):
Yi = αI (Ar ≥ 15) + β1p (Ar − 15) + β2I (Ar ≥ 15) ∗ p (Ar − 15) + θ + ur (1)
Where Yi is the tip amount in dollars, I (Ar ≥ 15) is an indicator function that the fare
is greater than or equal to $15, p (Ar − 15) is a polynomial in the fare centered at the
discontinuity, and θ is a vector of fixed effects. We use pick-up hour, day of week, pick-up
15
borough, and drop-off borough fixed effects. Since our source of variation is at the fare value
relative to the discontinuity, rather than the ride level, we follow Lee and Card (2008) and
cluster our standard errors at the level of the forcing variable, thereby correcting our degrees
of freedom and allowing for random specification errors due to the discrete bins. We estimate
four specifications in Table 3, starting with a 2nd order polynomial in the first column up
to a 5th order polynomial in the last column. Our local treatment effect is a $0.27 to $0.30
increase in tip amounts over a baseline level at the cut-off of $2.47.
Table 3: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of the Effect on Tip Amount
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tip Amt Tip Amt Tip Amt Tip Amt
b/se b/se b/se b/se
1 [Fare>=15] 0.292∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010)
Constant 2.392∗∗∗ 2.398∗∗∗ 2.393∗∗∗ 2.390∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
N 6,218,194 6,218,194 6,218,194 6,218,194
r2 0.208 0.208 0.208 0.208
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Column (1) - (4) present 2nd-5th order polynomials. Robust standard errors clustered at the fare amount relative to the
discontinuity ($15). All specifications include fixed effects for driver, pick-up day of the week, pick-up hour, pick-up location
borough, and drop-off location borough. The sample is limited to rides on Vendor-equipped taxi cabs with fares greater than
$5 and less than $25 during the first pricing regime (January 1, 2009 - October 31, 2009. 6am - 4pm on Monday - Friday and
6am - 8pm on Saturday and Sunday).
3.3 Other Outcomes of Interest
Our primary outcome of interest, tip amount, is produced through movements along an
extensive margin (using a default suggestion) and two intensive margins (amounts tipped
either manually or through one of the suggestions). Table 4 presents results for a number of
other variables.
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Table 4: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of the Effect on Alternative Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Tip Percent Default Tip Default Tip Amt Manual Tip Amt High Choice Med Choice Low Choice
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
1 [Fare>=15] 2.024∗∗∗ -0.243∗∗∗ 0.714∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.169∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.002) (0.003) (0.011) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Constant 15.574∗∗∗ 0.783∗∗∗ 2.596∗∗∗ 1.524∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.003) (0.004) (0.013) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
N 6,218,194 6,218,194 3,227,733 2,990,461 3,227,733 3,227,733 3,227,733
r2 0.098 0.058 0.568 0.122 0.015 0.029 0.038
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Columns 1 (Tip Percent), 3 (Default Tip Amount), and 4 (Manual Tip Amount) use continuous outcome variables,
while columns 2 (Default Tip), 5 (High Choice), 6 (Medium Choice), and 7 (Low Choice) use binary outcome variables. High
Choice (Vendor: $4 or 30%, Competitor: 25%), Medium Choice (V: $3 or 25%, C: 20%), Low Choice (V: $2 or 20%, C: 15%)
estimates are conditional on using a default tip option. Robust standard errors clustered at the fare amount relative to the
discontinuity ($15). All specifications use 3rd-order polynomials and include fixed effects for driver, pick-up day of the week,
pick-up hour, pick-up location borough, and drop-off location borough. The sample is limited to rides with fares greater than
$5 and less than $25 during the first pricing regime (January 1, 2009 - October 31, 2009. 6am - 4pm on Monday - Friday and
6am - 8pm on Saturday and Sunday).
Notably, the higher tip suggestions induce a 24 percentage point reduction in the proba-
bility of using a default suggestion, and a shift in the composition of those that use default
suggestions toward the low option. However, since the low option is approximately equal
to the medium option to the left of the discontinuity, we see a net increase in the amount
tipped by those that select a default option. There is also an increase in amount tipped
manually, which reflects a change in the composition of the tippers, but may also reflect the
influence of the higher suggestions on those that would tip manually when faced with either
set of suggestions.
3.4 Robustness
As our first robustness test, we repeat the visual RD graph for the Competitor. Figure 6
shows that the jump is absent for the Competitor. We re-estimate regression specification
(1), changing the outcome variable to ones that should not be significantly affected by the
default suggestions. Table 5 shows that the treatment effects are small and in conflicting
directions for ride distance and duration, and the effects on passenger count, hour of the
day, and day of the week are insignificant.
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Figure 6: Lowess Smoothed Mean Tip Percentages Within Each Discrete Fare Amount














5 10 15 20 25
fare
Vendor Fare < $15 Vendor Fare >= $15
Competitor Fare >= $15 Competitor Fare < $15
Mean [Vendor] Mean [Competitor]
Notes: Sample limited to cab rides during the first price regime: January 1, 2009 - October 31, 2009. 6am - 4pm on Monday -
Friday and 6am - 8pm on Saturday and Sunday.
Table 5: Falsification Test 1: Regression discontinuity for trip distance, ride duration, hour
of pick-up, day of the week, and passenger count
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Distance Duration Hour of Pick-Up Day of the Week Passenger Count
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
1 [Fare>=15] -0.015∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ -0.011 0.009 0.003
(0.005) (0.024) (0.012) (0.009) (0.002)
Constant 5.661∗∗∗ 15.409∗∗∗ 12.836∗∗∗ 3.096∗∗∗ 1.968∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.023) (0.014) (0.011) (0.003)
N 6,218,194 6,218,194 6,218,194 6,218,194 6,218,194
r2 0.884 0.780 0.378 0.059 0.901
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the fare amount relative to the discontinuity ($15). All specifications use 3rd-order
polynomials and include fixed effects for driver, pick-up day of the week, pick-up hour, pick-up location borough, and drop-off
location borough (except when one of these is the outcome variable]. The sample is limited to rides on Vendor-equipped taxi
cabs with fares greater than $5 and less than $25 during the first pricing regime (January 1, 2009 - October 31, 2009. 6am -
4pm on Monday - Friday and 6am - 8pm on Saturday and Sunday).
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Table 6: Falsification Test 2: Regression Discontinuity for Placebo Integers.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Tip Amt Tip Amt Tip Amt Tip Amt Tip Amt Tip Amt Tip Amt Tip Amt Tip Amt Tip Amt Tip Amt Tip Amt Tip Amt



























Constant 1.912∗∗∗ 1.994∗∗∗ 2.076∗∗∗ 2.166∗∗∗ 2.247∗∗∗ 2.319∗∗∗ 2.398∗∗∗ 2.724∗∗∗ 2.999∗∗∗ 3.237∗∗∗ 3.417∗∗∗ 3.643∗∗∗ 3.798∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
N 6,218,194 6,218,194 6,218,194 6,218,194 6,218,194 6,218,194 6,218,194 6,218,194 6,218,194 6,218,194 6,218,194 6,218,194 6,218,194
r2 0.207 0.207 0.207 0.207 0.207 0.207 0.208 0.207 0.207 0.207 0.207 0.207 0.206
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the fare amount relative to the discontinuity ($15). All specifications use 3rd-order polynomials and include fixed effects for driver,
pick-up day of the week, pick-up hour, pick-up location borough, and drop-off location borough. The sample is limited to rides on Vendor-equipped taxi cabs with fares greater
than $5 and less than $25 during the first pricing regime (January 1, 2009 - October 31, 2009. 6am - 4pm on Monday - Friday and 6am - 8pm on Saturday and Sunday).
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Finally, we estimate the RDD model at placebo integers, using a 3rd order polynomial in
all specifications. We see in Table 6 that while most of these values are precisely estimated,
they are smaller in magnitude than the $15 discontinuity, and often negative.
4 Comparing Across Vendors
While our regression discontinuity design provides compelling identification, it is limited to
a localized treatment effect. Furthermore, interpretation is complicated by the possibility
that customers may have difficulty translating the dollar amounts into percentages, and vice
versa. One way to expand upon our results would be to compare rides over which both
credit card machine companies provided percentage default suggestions. For fares above
$15, the Vendor provided suggestions of 20%, 25%, and 30%, while the competitor provided
suggestions of 15%, 20%, and 25%. However, Figure 7 shows that the geospatial distribution
of pick-up locations differs between the two companies, and that tip percentages also vary
by pick-up location.
Figure 7: Proportion of Rides Originating with a Vendor versus a Competitor Equipped











Notes: Graphs on the left display all of NYC. Graphs on the right display Manhattan. Sample limited to Vendor-equipped cab
rides during the first price regime: January 1, 2009 - October 31, 2009. 6am - 4pm on Monday - Friday and 6am - 8pm on
Saturday and Sunday.
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While we can control for the pick-up and drop-off location, there may be other unob-
servable differences in driver-customer match that affect the tip amounts. To address this
challenge, we limit our analysis to rides that originate at LaGuardia airport.14 Customers
queue at lines that contain a mix of taxis equipped with both credit card machine companies.
Figure 8 shows that the distribution of fares is comparable across the two credit card com-
panies when we limit the sample to rides that are above $15 and originate at LaGuardia.15
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Notes: The sample is limited to rides under the first pricing regime (January 1 - October 31, 2009; 6am - 4pm on Monday -
Friday and 6am - 8pm on Saturday/Sunday), for fares greater than or equal to $15, and only those rides that started at the
census tract associated with LaGuardia Airport (331).
For the distribution of tip percentages, we limit the sample to fares with tip percentages
less than or equal to 50% in order to provide greater visual clarity. Figure 9 demonstrates
14We exclude JFK airport because the majority of rides use a $45 fixed fare, complicating our placebo
test of equality in fares between vendors. In the web appendix, we repeat the analysis in this section pooling
both LGA and JFK observations. Our estimates in that pooled sample are qualitatively similar.
15However, it should be noted that a simple t-test of fare across the vendor (27.47) and competitor (27.36)
rejects equality (p = .0089).
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the stark difference in the two distributions, with the higher set of defaults inducing a
distribution that has significantly more density around its lowest option. The left tail of the
figure is also larger for the Vendor; however, this effect is limited to zero-valued tips.
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Notes: The sample is limited to rides under the first pricing regime (January 1 - October 31, 2009; 6am - 4pm on Monday -
Friday and 6am - 8pm on Saturday/Sunday), for fares greater than or equal to $15, and only those rides that started at the
census tract associated with LaGuardia Airport (331).
We provide a regression analysis of these effects in Table 7. To address concerns of
any type of sorting between drivers and credit card machine companies, we also provide
specifications with fixed effects for driver, pick-up hour, and borough of the drop-off location.
These restricted specifications isolate our estimates to the 19% of drivers in our sample
that drove on cars equipped by both of the vendors, allowing us to identify the coefficient
on “vendor” while controlling for time-invariant driver characteristics. We find that the
increase in fare is significant at the 5% level in specifications that do not include fixed effects
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(Column 1); however, this difference is insignificant in the specification that controls for
time-invariant driver characteristics (Column 2). We find a significant increase in the tip
percentage, consistent with our regression discontinuity estimates, though the effect size
is smaller in magnitude. We also find a reduction in the probability of using one of the
suggested amounts, also consistent with Section 3.
Table 7: OLS - Comparison of Vendor (20%/25%/30%) and Competitor (15%/20%/25%)
- Fare, Tip Percentage, and Default Tip
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fare Fare Tip Percent Tip Percent Default Tip Default Tip
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Vendor 0.117∗ 0.171 0.646∗∗∗ 0.713∗∗∗ -0.084∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.147) (0.099) (0.259) (0.004) (0.013)
Constant 27.358∗∗∗ 28.704∗∗∗ 18.700∗∗∗ 18.867∗∗∗ 0.632∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.750) (0.076) (1.454) (0.003) (0.078)
Fixed Effects X X X
N 101,710 18,184 101,710 18,184 101,710 18,184
r2 0.000 0.292 0.001 0.277 0.007 0.229
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the driver level. Even columns include fixed effects for driver, pick-up hour, and
drop-off borough. Columns 5 & 6 are linear probability models.
5 Cost of High Defaults
Our results in sections 3 & 4 highlight the revenue benefits of setting higher defaults. In
those two sections, we also show that high defaults result in a higher proportion of cus-
tomers foregoing the suggested amounts and instead keying in their own manual tip amount.
However, we find an increase in the manual tip average, and so this channel alone may not
be sufficient to reduce tips. In this section, we document an unambiguous cost of higher
defaults: the potential to discourage tipping altogether.
We first consider the across-vendor analysis of Section 4. Figure 9 documents a larger
density around the zero tip percentage for Vendor equipped taxi cabs. Table 8 repeats the
regression analysis of Table 7 with a binary outcome variable for leaving no credit card tip
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and one for leaving a small tip. Columns 3 and 4 show a small decrease in the probability of
leaving a tip greater than 0% but less than 10%; however, columns 1 and 2 show a significant
increase in the probability of leaving a zero-valued tip. This increase in the proportion of
zero-valued tips has some parallel in the vast literature on ultimatum games. Insofar as
customers have some fixed notion of a “fair” tip, presenting the higher suggestions might
have led them to punish the drivers by leaving a lower tip than would be provided in the
absence of the “unfair” split. This result highlights a potential cost of setting defaults too
high, although we cannot confirm whether this cost would persist in a context featuring
homogeneous suggestions across vendors.16 The backlash to high suggestions may hinge
on the existence of a reference “fair tip” in a comparable market. Furthermore, without
making strong assumptions, we cannot use this cost to trace out the set of optimal default
suggestions.
Table 8: OLS - Comparison of Vendor (20%/25%/30%) and Competitor (15%/20%/25%)-
Zero-Valued Tip
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Zero Tip Zero Tip TipPercent0to10 TipPercent0to10
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Vendor 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006)
Constant 0.039∗∗∗ 0.027 0.052∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗
(0.001) (0.026) (0.001) (0.044)
Fixed Effects X X
N 101,710 18,184 101,710 18,184
r2 0.004 0.220 0.000 0.214
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the driver level. Even columns include fixed effects for driver, pick-up hour, and
drop-off borough. The dependent variable in columns 1 & 2 is an indicator for whether the customer left a zero-valued tip,
while the dependent variable in columns 3 & 4 is an indicator for leaving a tip that is greater than 0% and less than 10% of
the fare.
There are a few possible alternative explanations of the increase in zero-valued tips. First,
16For example, all vendors currently offer the 20%/25%/30% suggestions.
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presenting customers with the 20%/25%/30% buttons (and the ability to key in any amount),
rather than the 15%/20%/25% buttons (and again the ability to key in any amount), may
have caused them to leave their tips in cash, for which we do not have data, rather than
credit (despite still opting to pay the fare in credit). A second, more plausible alternative
hypothesis is that these zero-valued tip entries reflect data errors that were more likely to
be produced by Vendor machines. In cleaning the data, we removed all zero-valued distance
and ride duration observations; however, we found that there were slightly more of these
distance errors associated with the Competitor (0.88% vs. 0.65%) and more ride duration
errors associated with the Vendor (.65% vs. .05%). It is possible that some of the zero-
valued tip percentage entries are residual electronic errors or tests, and that these tip errors
are more concentrated in Vendor credit card machines. Finally, a third hypothesis is that
our result is driven by possible differences in how the suggestions were presented by the
Competitor and Vendor.17
To rule out these last two alternative hypotheses, we again return to the regression
discontinuity specification. Figure 10 shows that this behavioral response is preserved when
looking within Vendor. Our regression estimate of the effect is a significant 1.7 percentage
point increase in the probability of leaving a zero-valued tip.18 These results suggest that
we are detecting a true negative behavioral response to the higher suggestions.
17Currently, the Vendor provides a visible conversion of the percentage into dollar amounts, while the
Competitor does not present this information. We do not know if this difference in information display was
present in 2009.
18This specification is similar to those used in Table 4 (i.e. a 3rd degree polynomial with fixed effects
for driver, day, hour, and boroughs of the pick-up and drop-off locations). The constant in the regression is
0.039.
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Notes: Sample limited to cab rides during the first price regime: January 1, 2009 - October 31, 2009. 6am - 4pm on Monday -
Friday and 6am - 8pm on Saturday and Sunday.
6 Default Mechanisms and Heterogeneity
We consider three complementary explanations for the observed default effect. First, cus-
tomers may be rationally inattentive if the cognitive effort or time costs are sufficiently high
to justify the additional tip. A second possible explanation is that the default serves an
information transmission purpose, acting as a signal of the social norm to unfamiliar cus-
tomers.19 Finally, customers may experience disutility from deviating from the status quo,
19Similarly, it is also possible that the tip suggestions themselves change the prevailing social norm, even
among experienced customers. For instance, on November 2008 the NY Times reported that “tips, which
hovered around 10 percent when cab rides were cash only, averaged 22 percent on credit-card transactions this
fall.” (Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/08/nyregion/08taxi.html) Given our lack of cash tip data
(and our limitation to 2009 data), we cannot substantiate this claim, nor can we comment on the long-term
effects of a change in the prevailing suggestion; however, a shift in norms is one plausible hypothesis for this
informal finding. The long-term effect of default policy changes is an interesting subject that merits further
research.
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either due to social pressure or other forms of psychological resistance.20 Our data do not
allow us to cleanly parse the three proposed mechanisms; however, we present a few tests
that attempt to shed light on their relative roles.
We first consider the information transmission mechanism. To rule out that the possibil-
ity that the default effect is entirely driven by information transmission, we split the sample
into Manhattan and other Boroughs. The purpose of this split is to reduce the concentration
of tourists, limiting us to riders that are more experienced with taxi cabs and the specific
NYC taxi tipping norms. An important caveat, which will apply to all of our heterogeneity
tests, is that we may not be isolating the proposed mechanism. Both the types of rides that
originate outside of Manhattan and the types of riders who live outside of Manhattan are
different along a number of possible dimensions (e.g. different social norms), and thus we
will potentially be conflating differences in information with other observable and unobserv-
able offsetting differences. With this critical caveat in mind, we proceed to estimate these
heterogeneous treatment effects. Table 9 shows that the default effect is of similar magnitude
across rides that originate inside Manhattan (Column 1) and rides that originate outside of
Manhattan (Column 2).
20A prime example of this social pressure mechanism is expressed in a New York Sun magazine article on
the introduction of the credit card system: “It forces you to tip,” a Manhattan resident who recently tipped
15% on a $14 fare, Greg Mack, said. “What if you didn’t enjoy the ride? It made me feel obligated.”(Source:
http://www.nysun.com/business/hot-tip-for-cabbies-credit-cards-boost-tips/72783/).
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Table 9: Heterogeneity by Pick-up/Drop-off Location: Regression Discontinuity Estimates










∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the fare amount relative to the discontinuity ($15). All specifications use 3rd-order
polynomials and include fixed effects for driver, pick-up day of the week, pick-up hour, pick-up location borough, and drop-off
location borough. The sample is limited to rides on Vendor-equipped taxi cabs with fares greater than $5 and less than $25
during the first pricing regime (January 1, 2009 - October 31, 2009. 6am - 4pm on Monday - Friday and 6am - 8pm on Saturday
and Sunday). Column 1 is limited to rides that originate inside Manhattan, while Column 2 is limited to rides that originate
outside Manhattan.
We next turn to the rational inattention explanation. Our first exercise examines how
the default effect varies with income. Because wealthier riders have a lower marginal utility
of income, they have less incentive to be attentive to the shift. Similarly, these customers will
potentially have higher time costs. This reasoning suggests that higher income customers
should (rationally) exhibit a larger default effect. Alternatively, wealthier individuals may
have greater access to distraction-reducing devices, allowing them to deplete less attention
during the day (Banerjee and Mullainathan 2008), and thus be less susceptible to default
effects. A wealthier customer may also be more likely to take more taxi rides, and default
effects possibly attenuate with experience (Lofgren et al 2012). Finally, income may be
unrelated to the default effect either due to a negligible time cost of the task or due to the
possible orthogonality of cognitive effort costs and income. However, using the underlying
income may not necessarily isolate differences in time costs or the marginal utility of income.
For example, drivers may expect lower tips from riders in lower income areas, and thus the
riders may experience less disutility in deviating from the default suggestion. Ultimately, this
exercise is only weakly suggestive of the rational inattention mechanism; however, it may be
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an intrinsically interesting source of heterogeneity. For example, Goldin and Homonoff (2012)
found that low-income customers were more attentive to a low salience cigarette tax than
were high income customers. In contrast, Beshears et al (2010) found that 401(k) savings
defaults had a greater influence on low-income employees than on high-income employees.
To proxy income, we use a variety of different sample groups. For the full sample, we
proxy customer income by the average of the median income associated with the pick up
location and drop-off location census tracts. These pick-up and drop-off locations would not
be an accurate assessment of tourists or any other customers that do not start or end at their
home address. To partially reduce this concern, we use a variety of other specifications that
attempt to remove these non-representative customers. One set of specifications limit the
sample to rides that both start and end outside Manhattan. Another set of specifications
limit to rides that either start or end at LaGuardia airport (proxying income by the median
income in the pick-up location census tract if the ride ends at LGA or by the income at the
drop-off location if the ride starts at LGA). Finally, the most conservative set of specifications
limits to rides that start at LaGuardia airport and end outside Manhattan. We then split
these rides into ten income quantiles and run the regression discontinuity for each of these
sub-samples. Figure 10 plots the coefficients from these regressions, finding no systematic
pattern in income. Although it might be that the absence of a clear pattern is due to
measurement error in the income variable, the constancy in the discontinuity suggests that
default effects are similar for customers across the different proxied income brackets in our
sample.
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Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the fare amount relative to the discontinuity ($15). All specifications use 3rd-order
polynomials and include fixed effects for driver, pick-up day of the week, pick-up hour, pick-up location borough, and drop-off
location borough. The sample is limited to rides on Vendor-equipped taxi cabs with fares greater than $5 and less than $25
during the first pricing regime (January 1, 2009 - October 31, 2009. 6am - 4pm on Monday - Friday and 6am - 8pm on Saturday
and Sunday).
Finally, to investigate the hypothesis that cognitive effort costs drive reliance on the
default suggestions, we plot the usage of a default tip button at different fare. We hypothesize
that usage of a default button should decrease around numbers upon which it is easier to
perform mental computations, e.g. $20. Figure 11 does not provide clear evidence consistent
with this hypothesis.
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Figure 12: Computational Costs: Proportion of Customers that Use a Default Option by

























Base Amount; $0.4 Bins
Notes: The sample is limited to rides on Vendor-equipped taxi cabs with fares greater than $15 and lower than $65 and during
the first pricing regime (January 1, 2009 - October 31, 2009. 6am - 4pm on Monday - Friday and 6am - 8pm on Saturday and
Sunday).
7 Conclusion
Using an extensive dataset, we show that a small change in default tip suggestions has a
significant effect on tipping amounts. Our data allow us to provide very clean identification
in a large naturalistic field setting. We use a regression discontinuity design to show that an
upward shift in the set of suggestions induces higher average tip amounts, despite significantly
reducing the probability that customers use one of the defaults. To address concerns about
differences in the framing of suggestions (dollar amounts vs. percentages), as well as to
provide less localized treatment effect estimates, we performed a secondary analysis of trips
originating at the airport. Exploiting these quasi-random driver-to-customer matches, we
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again find that higher default tip suggestions (20%/25%/30% vs. 15%/20%/25%) result in
higher average tip amounts. This analysis also reveals a potential cost of setting defaults
too high – customers are also more likely to leave no tip in response to the higher defaults.
Finally, we highlight potential mechanisms and show a surprising dearth of heterogeneity in
our treatment effects. As firms begin to use the insights of behavioral economics to inform
their product design and promotion, our study suggests that default effects can be exploited
even in habitually encountered consumer choices. However, there may be a backlash to
defaults that exceed certain thresholds, and so firms and policy makers alike should be
cognizant of this potential cost when optimally designing their defaults.
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A Appendix
Our final dataset was constructed by first performing a number of consistency checks and
then removing data that appeared to be generated by electronic tests or other types of data
errors. The full sample of 170,896,479 was reduced to 13,820,735 observations by performing
a number of procedures. First, we made the following consistency adjustments:
1. The pick-up came after the drop-off time in 0.14% (241,965) of observations. We
replaced these pick-up times with their drop-off times, and vice-versa.
2. The drop-off time came after the pick-up time of the subsequent trip in 0.36% (618,945)
of observations. We set the drop-off time equal to the pick-up time of the subsequent
trip for all of these cases.
The full sample of 170,896,479 was reduced to 163,348,802 by dropping all observations
for which:
1. The payment type was “No Charge” (509,194; .30%) or “Dispute” (94,784; .06%).
2. The ride duration was either equal to zero or longer than 3 hours (619,468; 0.36%).
3. The distance was either equal to zero or greater than 100 miles (929,480; 0.55%).
4. The surcharge was greater than $1 (75,295; 0.04%).
5. Corresponding to drivers that drove fewer than 100 rides in 2009 (58,494; 0.03%).
6. Multiple cars were associated with the same driver during the same shift (1,298,431;
0.77%).
7. The driver’s shift was longer than 20 hours (3,872,210; 2.31%).
8. The driver’s shift was shorter than 30 minutes (89,616; 0.05%).
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We then dropped the 5.95% (9,719,003) of observations that were on cars equipped with
the third credit card machine vendor. Next, we dropped observations for which either the
pick-up location or drop-off location could not be mapped to a census tract in NY, NJ,
CT, or PA (2,022,206; 0.13%). To ensure that the regression discontinuity is identified off
representative rides, we dropped all rides that had toll amounts applied.21 This dropped
the 4,882,697 (3.22%) rides which were associated with a toll amount greater than zero. We
then made the largest sample reduction, removing the 108,620,392 rides paid by cash, as
the data did not include tip information for these rides. From this sample of 38,104,504
rides, we further limited to those rides for which the base amount (the sum of the fare, tolls,
surcharge, and tax) was equivalent to the “fare”. Performing this reduction ensured that
rides on either side of the discontinuity were comparable in terms of the time of day, time of
year, and the fees faced by the customer. This reduction left 13,936,381 rides that occurred
prior to November 1, 2009 and between the hours of 6am to 4pm on Monday through Friday
or 6am to 8pm on Saturday and Sunday. Finally, we removed rides that didn’t correspond
to a multiple of $0.40 (the unit of fare accrual) added to $2.50 (the flat entry fee), leaving
13,820,735 observations in the final sample.
21Furthermore, including tolls complicates the comparison of Competitor and Vendor tip amounts, as the
Competitor default tips were computed on the total base amount (including Tolls), while the Vendor default
tips were computed only on the fare.
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B Web Appendix
B.1 Comparing Across Vendors
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Notes: The sample is limited to rides under the first pricing regime (January 1 - October 31, 2009; 6am - 4pm on Monday -
Friday and 6am - 8pm on Saturday/Sunday), for fares greater than or equal to $15, and only those rides that started at the
census tracts associated with JFK Airport.
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Figure B.3: LGA & JFK Pooled Sample: Distribution of Tip Percentages Across the
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Notes: The sample is limited to rides under the first pricing regime (January 1 - October 31, 2009; 6am - 4pm on Monday -
Friday and 6am - 8pm on Saturday/Sunday), for fares greater than or equal to $15, and only those rides that started at the
census tracts associated with LaGuardia Airport and JFK Airport.
Table B.1: LGA & JFK Pooled Sample: OLS - Comparison of Vendor (20%/25%/30%)
and Competitor (15%/20%/25%) customer outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Fare FareFE TipPercent TipPercentFE DefaultTip DefaultTipFE TipPercent0to10 TipPercent0to10FE ZeroTip ZeroTipFE
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Vendor 0.732∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.009∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.165) (0.075) (0.177) (0.003) (0.010) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
Constant 31.957∗∗∗ 36.606∗∗∗ 17.651∗∗∗ 16.383∗∗∗ 0.619∗∗∗ 0.639∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.349) (0.057) (0.333) (0.002) (0.018) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.009)
N 176,220 30,006 176,220 30,006 176,220 30,006 176,220 30,006 176,220 30,006
r2 0.001 0.349 0.001 0.203 0.011 0.163 0.000 0.141 0.004 0.152
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the driver level. Even columns include fixed effects for driver, pick-up hour, and
drop-off borough. Columns 5-8 are linear probability models. The dependent variable in columns 5 & 6 is an indicator for
leaving a tip that is greater than 0% and less than 10% of the fare, while the dependent variable in columns 7 & 8 is an
indicator for whether the customer left a zero-valued tip. The sample is limited only those rides that started at the census
tracts associated with LaGuardia Airport and JFK Airport.
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B.2 Default Mechanisms and Heterogeneity
Table B.2: Heterogeneity by Number of Passengers: Regression Discontinuity estimates of
Default Effect on Tip Amount
(1) (2) (3) (4)
One Two Three Four
b/se b/se b/se b/se
1 [Fare>=15] 0.299∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.012) (0.024) (0.048)
Constant 2.401∗∗∗ 2.387∗∗∗ 2.336∗∗∗ 2.386∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.017) (0.032) (0.073)
N 3,911,662 851,296 241,251 85,979
r2 0.208 0.225 0.206 0.256
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the fare amount relative to the discontinuity ($15). All specifications use 3rd-order
polynomials and include fixed effects for driver, pick-up day of the week, pick-up hour, pick-up location borough, and drop-off
location borough. The sample is limited to rides on Vendor-equipped taxi cabs with fares greater than $5 and less than $25
during the first pricing regime (January 1, 2009 - October 31, 2009. 6am - 4pm on Monday - Friday and 6am - 8pm on Saturday
and Sunday).
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Figure B.4: Computational Costs: Proportion of Customers that Use a Default Option by
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Notes: The sample is limited to rides on Vendor-equipped taxi cabs with fares greater than $15 and lower than $135 and during
the first pricing regime (January 1, 2009 - October 31, 2009. 6am - 4pm on Monday - Friday and 6am - 8pm on Saturday and
Sunday).
